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RENT CONTROL: THE MAXIMUM RENT DATE METHOD
JOHN W. WILLIS t
Three main methods of fixing maximum rents have been employed
in various parts of the world: the "fair rents" system, under which
some attempt is made to fix rents for individual buildings or dwelling
units on a basis of fairness to the landlord and the tenant; 1 the "per-
centage" method, whereby rents are fixed on an over-all basis at a
percentage of the value of the property; 2 and the "maximum rent date"
or "freeze" method. It is the purpose of this article to examine some
of the problems arising in the application of the latter system of rent
control.
The basic theory of the "maximum rent date" or "freeze" method
of controlling rents is that maximum rents are fixed with relation to
the rents actually charged for the particular property, or comparable
property, on a given date or during a given period. Many variations
have been rung on this theme; many exceptions are made or adjust-
ments allowed, but the basic idea has been employed more widely than
any other method of regulating rents. Examples of its use may be
found as far back as 1680 in Spain 3 and 1755 in Portugal; ' and long
before that the Popes had frozen rents in Rome.' In one form or an-
other the method has been used in Great Britain, France, Italy and
many other countries of Europe, as well as in Canada, Latin America,
Africa, Asia and Australia. It was adopted by Congress in the Dis-
trict of Columbia Emergency Rent Act of 1941 and consistently cham-
pioned and employed by the Office of Price Administration and its
successor agencies 6 with the at first tacit and eventually express ap-
proval of the Congress.
f A.B., 1934, University of California at Los Angeles; LL.B., 1937, University
of Southern California; member of bars of California, United States Court of Appeals
for District of Columbia, and United States Supreme Court.
1. See Willis, "Fair Rents" Systems, 16 GEo. WksH. L. REV. 104 (1947).
2. See Willis, Maximum Rents-The "Percentage" Method, 23 TEMP. L. Q. 122
(1949).
3. A Real pragmatica of 1680 reduced the price of pasture lands to the level of
1633, and later the Consejo by an auto acordado of 1702 ruled that pasture lands could
not be rented for more than in 1692. INFoRmE DE LA REAL ACADEMIA DE CIENc A
MORALES Y POLImCAS SOBRE LA REFORMA DE LAS LEYES DE INQUiLiNATO Y LES ME-
DIOS DE CONTENER EL AUMENTO DESPROPORCIONADO DE LoS ALQUILERES DE EDIFIcIoS
12 (Madrid, 1863).
4. Decree of December 3, 1755 (year of the Lisbon earthquake).
5. The writer purposes to write an article on the history of rent control, to appear
in another law review.
6. Use of the method was advocated even before enactment of the Emergency
Price Control Act, 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 901 et seq. (Supp. 1948), by
the NATIONAL DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMISSION BULLETIN No. 7, pp. 10-11 (1941),
and by the non-statutory Office of Price Administration in INSTRUCTIONS FOR Oa-
GANIZATION AND OPERATION OF FAIR RENT COMMITTEES, p. 7 (1941). It was gen-
erally used by the local fair rent committees prior to enactment of the Emergency
Price Control Act. OPA, FIRST QUARTERL.Y REPORT 49 (1942).
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The merits and demerits of the freeze method can be better con-
sidered after the workings of the system have been examined in detail.
In brief, however, the case for the freeze system can be stated as follows:
Under this procedure, landlords and tenants know with as
much certainty as possible the legal rent on any particular dwelling
unit. Occasions for dispute are minimized. Long-drawn-out pro-
ceedings to determine individual rents are avoided, and the pro-
gram takes immediate hold. Delay and frustration through
numerous and lengthy proceedings, such as have characterized
previous rent-control programs, have been eliminated by the adop-
tion of rents determined by the normal market.7
The rental existing on a basic date not too far in the
past [has] the administrative merit of being a definite fact easily
ascertained and providing a simple criterion for enforcement, and
it [has] in addition the advantage of being an amount upon which
landlord and tenant had agreed at a date before wartime congestion
had become a serious factor.8
A more disinterested observer-Lord Justice Scott of the English
Court of Appeal-has commented that
. . . the primary principle which, from the outset of the legis-
lation in 1915, must really have underlain the decision of Parlia-
ment to use the rental figure arrived at by the parties themselves
when at arm's length [was] that the letting of the house in a free
market, that is to say, one unrestricted by statutory limitation, can
be used as the basic and permanent criterion of what can in fair-
ness to the parties be treated as the "standard rent" of the house.9
He further stated that the standard rent was based on "probable fair-
ness." Substantially the same concept was expressed earlier by an Irish
commission, which pointed out that the standard rent was fixed on the
basis of the rent on August 3, 1914 on the theory that prior to the war
rents generally were fair competitive rents representing a fair return on
the landlord's investment, and that any increased rents obtainable under
war and post-war conditions would be monopolistic in character.10 One
member, however, in his separate report remarked rather acidly that
7. OPA, SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT 59 (1942). For more elaborate expositions
of OPA's viewpoint see In the Matter of Theresa E. Reimel, 1 OPA Op. & Dec.1385 (1942); 900 Michigan Avenue North Corp., 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1402 (1942),
aff'd in Wilson v. Brown, 137 F.2d 348 (E.C.A. 1943).
8. Canada, WARTMrE PRICES & TRADE BOARD, REPORT, Sept. 3, 1939-March 31,
1943, p. 10.
9. Winchester Court Ltd. v. Miller, 60 T.L.R. 498 (Ct. Ap. 1944).
10. REPORT, TOWN TENANTS TRmUNAL 18 (1941). See also page 14 (theory of
the acts was that the landlord was not to make more, or at least not much more, out
of the house than he did before the war).
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.. the rent levels of the Rent Restriction Acts were not fixed
to conform with any abstract idea of "fairness"-they were fixed
upon a rough and ready makeshift basis . .
THE MAXIMUM RENT DATE
The first step in applying the maximum rent date system is of
course the selection of a maximum rent date. The purpose is to choose
a date on which rents on the whole were reasonable and had not yet
been affected by the abnormal conditions which made control necessary.
The date should not be too far in the past since the more remote the
date, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain what any particular rent
was at that time.
The selection of any particular date is of course to a large degree
arbitrary; it cannot be otherwise. As an Irish commission has said,
in commenting on the choice of August 3, 1914 as the freeze date in the
original English and Irish legislation, doubtless the conditions which
prevented competition from accomplishing its normal effect of keeping
profiteering in check "did not come into being in the twinkling of an
eye on 4th August, 1914; but some date had to be fixed, and 3rd
August appeared to be, on the whole, the best selection." 12
Whether the legislature is to set the date itself or empower the
administrative agency to fix it is a matter of choice and depends largely
on local conditions. When Congress passed the District of Columbia
Emergency Rent Act it selected January 1, 1941 as the crucial date;
but the Emergency Price Control Act, enacted two months later,13
provided only that
So far as practicable, in establishing any maximum rent
I the Administrator shall ascertain and give due considera-
tion to the rents prevailing for such accommodations, or com-
parable accommodations, on or about April 1, 1941 (or if, prior
or subsequent to April 1, 1941, defense activities shall have re-
sulted or threatened to result in increases in rents for housing
accommodations in such area inconsistent with the purposes of
this Act, then on or about a date (not earlier than April 1, 1940),
which, in the judgment of the Administrator, does not reflect such
increases). 14
Originally, April 1, 1940 was to be the base date, probably because there
was a good deal of census data on rents as of that date. But it was
11. Separate report of Mr. Herlihy, id. at 207.
12. REPoRT, TowN TENANTS TRIBUNAL. 19 (1941).
13. When Congress eventually assumed a greater degree of control over rents in
the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 193, 50 U.S.C. § 1001 (1947), it froze
rents at those chargeable under the Emergency Price Control Act, supra note 6, on
June 30, 1947.
14. Emergency Price Control Act, supra note 6, § 2(b).
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thought that the date would serve only as a starting point.'. A Senate
amendment, however, changed the provision, making April 1, 1940,
the ultimate date beyond which the Administrator could not go. As
it turned out, the provision did not mean much in practice; the Adminis-
trator always recited that he had "considered" rents on or about April
1, 1941, but usually set the maximum rent date at some later point.'
Except for the April 1, 1940 limitation, the language of the Act
left the selection of the particular date almost entirely in the discretion
of the Administrator. In the earlier actions, the Administrator at-
tempted to key the date selected to the type of defense activity in the
area and to the vacancy ratio.' This was a complicated process, call-
ing for a good deal of expertise.' 8 Eventually, of course, the references
to April 1, 1941 and to "defense activities" became anachronistic, and
in the last areas brought under control maximum rent dates as late as
January 1, 1946 were specified.' 9
The Administrator's choice of a maximum rent date, particularly
with respect to those areas brought under control in 1942 and 1943,
was subject to considerable criticism from real estate interests, who
contended that because of the tendency of rents to lag behind the gen-
eral price level, rents were frozen at or near depression levels in many
areas; the average rent in 1943 was said to be 22% below 1929.20 The
15. Remarks of Congressman Steagall, 87 CONG. REc. 9072 (1942).
16. Of the first 323 areas designated as areas subject to potential rent regulation,
including a population of some 86,000,000, four-fifths had a maximum rent date of
March 1, 1942. OPA, FIRST QuARTERLY REPORT 53 (1942). On October 5, 1942, all
areas not previously designated were named for possible future control with a maxi-
mum rent date of March 1, 1942. In some cases a later date specified when control
was actually instituted.
17. OPA, FrsT QUARTERLY REPoRT 53-4 (1942).
18. Equitable Trust Co. v. Bowles, 143 F.2d 735 (E.C.A. 1944). In determining
the most recent date on which defense activities had not caused rdnt increases, the
court said, the Administrator "must consider the general characteristics of the area,
the type of industry, if any, which existed prior to the advent of defense activities, the
available supply of suitable labor, the kind and amount of defense activity introduced,
the extent and rate of population growth, the trend of unemployment, the trend of
wages, the supply of and demand for housing prior to the introduction of defense
activities, the construction of new housing, the types of housing, the size (including
percentage and amount) and frequency of rent increases, and recommendations of
state and local officials. . .. All the factors which we have named for the Administra-
tor's consideration, and probably others, are inextricably interwoven in this question
of selecting a proper rent ceiling. A charge of discrimination in applying the stand-
ards of the Act to the circumstances of various areas cannot be sustained unless a
comparison is made of all these essential factors affecting rent control in the com-
plaining area with the same factors in the areas claimed to have been favored." In
this case the court rejected the contention that the administrator had erred in applying
the April 1, 1941, date to the Detroit area, and held that no discrimination in favor
of other areas had been shown.
As to different maximum rent dates for different areas see also E. M. Wesner,
1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1437 (1943).
19. Amdt. 105 to Rent Regulation for Housing, 11 Fun. RPE. 13028 (Nov. 1,
1946).
20. New York Journal of Commerce, April 10, 1946.
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Price Administrator consistently rejected all such arguments, 2' and
he was never reversed by the Emergency Court of Appeals, nor did
Congress take any action to overrule him.21 In 1948 the Housing
Expediter, in partially approving a local board recommendation for a
rent increase for Oklahoma City, conceded that the rent level on the
freeze date, March 1, 1942, was 9% below the level of March 1, 1939
in the area. 4
The idea of fixing rents by reference to a single date of course
involves a fiction. Rents do not change from day to day, and in most
areas there is no one "moving day," such as October 1st once was in
New York, on which most yearly leases start, so that freezing rents
as of a given date in many individual cases means freezing them as of
the date. six months or nine months or a year earlier, when the lease in
effect on the maximum rent date was made. As long as rents were
generally fair and equitable for the area as a whole on the maximum
rent date, however, the Price Administrator held that it was immaterial
that for some landlords the rent on that date might actually have been
fixed at an earlier time.2 5
Another objection to the maximum rent date system is that it
favors "bullish real-estate manipulators" who raised rents before the
maximum rent date at the expense of those landlords who did not.2"
If the maximum rent date really reflected a purely competitive situa-
tion, this would not be true since the law of supply and demand would
not have permitted any unconscionable increases. At least under
modern conditions, 27 the maximum rent date is something of a com-
promise and there probably is some validity to the objection, particu-
larly where prior to the date landlords had been urged to hold rents
down by government officials or voluntary fair rent committees with-
out actual power to prevent increases on the part of uncooperative
owners.2 8 The Price Administrator rejected all suggestions that he
distinguish between landlords who had made "unwarranted" rent in-
creases prior to the crucial date and those who had not, on the grounds
21. Elbert H. Ash, 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1408 (1943) ; Spotswood Gardens, Inc.,
1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1432 (1943); E. M. Wesner. 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1437 (1943).
22. See Spaeth v. Brown, 137 F.2d 669 (E.C.A. 1943).
23. H.R. 993, §4(a) (Jan. 11, 1943) would have prevented the establishment of
rent ceilings lower than the rentals prevailing for "such property" on Sept. 15, 1942,
but no action was taken on the bill.
24. See Recommendation of Local Advisory Board for Oklahoma County, 170 F.2d
556 (E.C.A. 1948).
25. Spotswood Gardens, Inc., 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1432 (1943) ; Norman A. Avant,
1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1463, aff'd Avant v. Bowles, 139 F.2d 702 (E.C.A. 1943).
26. Remarks of Rep. Monkiewicz, 90 CoNG. REc. 5564 (1944). See also Remarks
of Rep. Outland, id. 5678.
27. The situation may be different where a date like August 3, 1914 is specified,
as in the British Acts.
28. Winnet, Rent Control-The Philadelphia Experiment, 14 PA. B.A.Q. 71, 75
(1942).
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that it would be administratively impossible to determine which in-
creases were unwarranted, and that there was no necessity to erase
the differences in rents which normally exist in a free competitive
market.29 A general policy of adjusting all rents on a comparability
basis was thought to be undesirable.
It has been suggested that rents should be frozen at the average
rent charged over a period of time, rather than on the basis of rents
charged on a particular date.3 This idea is superficially attractive, but
in practice it would not work well. One great advantage of the maxi-
mum rent date is that it makes it easy to determine the maximum rent;
but this advantage is lost if rents over a period of months or years must
be averaged.31 Difficulties are presented also if the property was vacant
during part of the period; and if the rent was low because of special
circumstances at any time during the period, the same problem arises
as where it was low on the maximum rent date . 2  The averaging idea
has been used almost nowhere except in the case of resort or seasonal
accommodations.
3
Ordinarily the same maximum rent date applies to all accommoda-
tions covered. Theoretically, at least, this may result in an injustice,
since inflationary pressures may affect some classes of housing at a
later date than others. The Price Administrator, however, dismissed
29. William F. Chatlos, 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1390 (1942), aff'd Chatlos v. Brown,
136 F.2d 490 (E.C.A. 1943); Modern Homes, Inc., 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1406 (1943);
Spotswood Gardens, 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1432; American Hotel Co., 1 OPA Op. &
Dec. 1491 (1943).
Adjustment on the ground of "peculiar circumstances" was refused landlords who
claimed that they hadi not raised their rents because of the activities of a "fair rent"
committee. Rent Memorandum 5 (a) (11)-II, OPA SEav. 200:1748-I (1944).
The fact that the Administrator originally indicated that March 1, 1942 would be
the maximum rent date when control was imposed in the New York City area, but
eventually set the date at March 1, 1943, did not entitle landlords who had lowered
rents after March 1, 1942 to an upward adjustment. 315 West 95th Street Realty Co.,
Inc., 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3045 (1944). See also Robert Trimble, 2 OPA Op. & Dec.
3192 (1944); 1165 Park Avenue Corp. v. Bowles, 150 F.2d 117 (E.C.A. 1945).
30. Note, 50 YALE L.J. 176, 181 (1940). Under a bill drafted by the Citizens'
Housing Council of New York, and introduced in the New York legislature as S.I.
2111 (1940), rents would have been frozen at the average monthly rent charged during
the year prior to control, but not more than 25% above the lowest rent charged during
that year except for capital improvements.
31. Maloney Land & Improvement Co., 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1381 (1942).
32. NATIONAL DEF-NSE ADvisoRY COmMIssioN, Bulletin No. 7, p. 11 (1941).
33. Under the Miami Rent Regulation, § 4(a), the maximum rent for accommoda-
tions rented on September 1, 1943 was the rent on that tiate, or one-twelfth of the
total rent for the year ending August 31, 1943, whichever was higher. See Jack Oberson,
Docket No. RPA-IV-31-P (OPA, 1944) ; France, Law of July 22, 1943, Art. 1, par.
3 (in bathing, climatic or thermal resorts, rent fixed according to rent of annual let-
ting) ; Indo-China, Decree No. 1406, Art. 2 (1942) (as to seacoast or mountain re-
sorts, follow rents for 1938 season rather than Jan. 1, 1938 rent). A possible exception
is Palestine, Ordinance No. 6, §6 (1941), by which rents of commercial accommoda-
tions were limited to the rent paid for the year prior to the critical date plus 25%; as
to premises completed during the year, the rent on the last day of the year controlled,
subject to adjustment up or down, or if it was not let on the last day the Rent Com-
missioner fixed the rent. See also Assam, Act No. 3, §§ 3, 4 (1946) (average monthly
rent paid during January-September 1943).
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objections to the applicability of March 1, 1943 as the maximum rent
date for residential apartment hotels and residential clubs in New York
City-made on the ground that these accommodations had not under-
gone undue rent rises as of that date-saying that no class of accom-
modations was free from inflationary pressures and that OPA "policy"
was to have a single maximum rent date for all accommodations in
the area. 4
For historical reasons, the British Acts provide two different
maximum rent dates-August 3, 1914 and September 1, 1939. Newly-
constructed housing was not subject to control from 1920 to 1939, and
in addition a large number of units were decontrolled piecemeal under
a provision of the 1923 Act decontrolling any accommodation within
a specified rent range if the landlord obtained vacant possession.3 5 On
the outbreak of World War II, however, rents of these hitherto free
units were frozen at September 1, 1939 levels. As might be expected,
there is considerable disparity between the maximum rents of 1920-Act
houses and 1939-Act houses. As yet, however, nothing has been done
to remedy the situation."0 The remoteness of the 1914 date which still
determines the rent of many houses is also a defect in the British
system.
3 7
THE MAXIMum RENT
In theory, the maximum rent under the freeze system is the rent
charged on the maximum rent date. This seemingly simple formula
gives rise to many questions, as will be seen.
Ordinarily the maximum rent is in rem and does not vary accord-
ing to the tenant, but exceptions to this principle may be found. The
OPA, for instance, retained the rent schedules used by the Army and
Navy in their housing projects, whereby the rent varied according to
the tenant's rank or salary grade."8 Under the Rumanian law of
34. Hutton Hall Operating Co., Inc., 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3221 (1944). Cf. 31
West 72d Street Corp., 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3239 (1945) ; New York Towers, Inc., 2
OPA Op. & Dec. 3249 (1945).
35. Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. V, c. 32,
§ 2. When the 1939 Act went into effect -there were about 4,000,000 pre-1919 houses
subject to rent control and about 4,500,000 decontrolled, the average rent of the latter
group being about 30% above that of the former group (50% in London). REPORT,
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CoMmiTTEE ON RENT CONTROL, CMD. No. 6621, p. 8 (1945).
36. The Inter-Departmental Committee, supra note 35, recommended various
changes but the Government has found itself too occupied to enact any new legislation
except for limited amendments in the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949,
12 & 13 GEo. VI, c. 40.
37. REPoRT, supra note 35, at 13. The Committee recommended a registration sys-
tem to remove this defect. The Irish Act of 1946 follows a somewhat different plan
but also makes it unnecessary now to refer back to 1914. REPORT, TOWN TENANTS
TRIBUNAL 20 (Dublin, 1941). Cf. France, Law of May 30, 1943, freezing rents at the
June 30, 1943 level rather than on the basis of the 1914 rental value as under the Law
of April 30, 1926.
38. OPA, FOURTH Q. REP. 59 (1943).
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19 46 ,'
9 rents were fixed at double, triple or five times the 1945-46 rent.
Which coefficient applied depended upon what category the tenant fell
into (e.g., public official, journalist, student, professional, business
man). These coefficients could be increased 50% or 100% if the total
income of the tenant and his family exceeded specified sums. A similar
provision was found in a Greek law of 1946.40 Thus, we see that
in many countries the rent on the maximum rent date is merely a start-
ing point with the actual maximum rent being determined by multiply-
ing that figure by a percentage or, under extreme inflationary condi-
tions, by several hundred or thousand.4
The courts have not been in agreement on the question whether
the rent which is frozen is the rent reserved and payable in the lease in
effect on the maximum rent date, or the rent which the landlord was
actually receiving on that date. The q4estion has arisen particularly
under the New York commercial and business rent laws. In Auswin
Realty Corp. v. Kirschbauin,4 2 the owner without consideration had
agreed, prior to the maximum rent date, to accept a lower rent than
that reserved in the lease "for the duration." The court held that the
maximum rent was nevertheless determined by the amount reserved
in the lease, asking what would have been the situation, under the con-
trary argument, if the tenant had occupied rent free on the maximum
rent date. Similar holdings were made in other cases. 43  Where the
tenant on the maximum rent date was given an allowance in lieu of
decorating, amounting to a 20% reduction in rent, the court refused to
consider the allowance as changing the amount of rent reserved and
payable.44 And where the lease in effect on the freeze date provided
for a payment of a percentage of the tenant's gross income over a given
amount, the fact that the gross income in that year did not reach the
minimum amount did not mean that the landlord was not entitled to a
39. Law No. 330, Arts. 6, 7 (1943). The Decree of April 6, 1943 had imposed
an additional 159 rent on Jews, stateless persons and companies with at least 40%
Jewish capital.
40. Legislative Decree of May 11, 1946.
41. E.g., Nanking, Temporary Standards for House Rents, Art. 2 (1946) (500
times October 1937 rent for houses, 1000 times for stores) ; Shanghai, Ordinance of
April 1, 1946 t140 times 1937 rent for residences, 180 times for business premises) ;
Tangier, Law of July, 1946, Arts. 8, 9 (January 1, 1940 rent multiplied three to six
times); Belgium, Decree Law of March 12, 1945, Art. 6 (Aug. 1, 1939 rent increased
40%) ; Luxembourg, Law of March 21, 1947, Art. 1 (Jan. 1, 1939 rent increased 50%).
For data as to increases allowed in the post-World War I European laws see
EURoPEAN ITOUSING PROBLEMS, passim (I.L.O., 1923).
Discussion of increases in maximum rents, whether over-all or by individual adjust-
ments, is beyond the scope of this article.
42. 270 App. Div. 334, 59 N.Y.S.2d 824 (2d Dep't 1946).
43. Segal v. Renweis Holding Corp., 72 N.Y.S.2d (App. Term 1st Dep't 1947);
140 West 69th Street Corp. v. Simis, 115 N.Y.L.J. 725 (Muni. Ct. 1945); cf. Manu-
facturers Trust Co. v. Arvin Chemists, Inc., 60 N.Y.S.2d 504 (City Ct. 1946).
44. 18 Realty Corp. v. Paley, 56 N.Y.S.2d 466 (N.Y. Muni. Ct. 1945).
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percentage in later years.4 5  A contrary result was reached in two
cases where the lease had been expressly modified by a written agree-
ment reducing the rent, even though in one case the reduction was "for
the duration" " and in the other case for the period of gasoline and tire
rationing.4 7  The OPA took the view that the amount which the land-
lord actually received on the maximum rent date was the ceiling, and
not what he could have obtained under the lease.4
Realistically, it would seem that the maximum rent should be
the rent actually paid on the freeze date and not what the landlord
might have had the legal right to demand. The contrary view would
permit a foresighted landlord to evade rent ceilings by making a lease
for an inflated rent, prior to the'freeze date, with the understanding that
a lesser rent would be accepted.49  Either view is likely to cause hard-
ship in particular fact situations, and liberal provisions for adjustment
should be made.
PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION
Freezing rents by legislative fiat is not a cure-all; more problems
are created than are solved by that action. Maximum rents must be
fixed for accommodations not rented on the freeze date, perhaps not
even in existence on that date. Accommodations which were rented
on the critical date may change; the premises may be reconstructed,
premises previously let as a whole may be let in parts or vice versa,
furniture may be added or taken away, the premnises may be sublet.
The rent on the maximum rent date may have been affected by some
extraordinary circumstance, or-as often happens when the maximum
rent date is many years in the past-it may simply be impossible to
ascertain what the rent was on that date. Statistics show that even
in the first year of OPA rent control, in 9% of the cases the rent regis-
45. Seven Eleven Fifth Avenue, Inc. v. Dave Herstein Co., Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d
607 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1947).
46. 86 Near Second Ave. Corp. v. Fennekohl, 61 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. Muni. Ct.
1946). The court distinguished the Auswin case, 270 App. Div. 334, 59 N.Y.S.2d
824 (2d Dep't 1946), on the ground that there was no written modification of the
lease in that case. But cf. Pilkdngton v. Connolly, 68 Ir. L.T.R. 144 (1934), where
a rent reduction by endorsement on the lease was apparently disregarded.
47. McDougall v. Service Garage, Inc., 187 N.Y. Misc. 950, 69 N.Y.S.2d 176
(N.Y. Muni. Ct. 1946).
48. Fasons Realty Corp., 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3036 (1944) ; OPA Interpretation
4(a)-VII. See also 877 Fifth Avenue Corp., 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3292 (1945) (amount
received by landlord on freeze date is maximum rent even though part was from a
sub-tenant and the balance from the original tenant under a new arrangement). But
cf. Woods v. Callahan, 172 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1949) (where tenant in occupation on
maximum rent date was obligated by lease to pay certain taxes, such taxes were
to be included in determining the maximum rent even though the tenant did not
in fact pay them during the freeze period).
49. Cf. Mrs. Martha B. King, 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1379 (1942) (lease made on
Nov. 23, 1940, to commence Sept. 1, 1941, at increased rent, nullified by later estab-
lishment of January 1, 1941 maximum rent date).
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tered was not the rent in effect on the maximum rent date; " and the
percentage grew steadily with the passage of time.51
This inadequacy of the rent freeze to take care of every case makes
it necessary that it be supplemented by other methods of fixing maxi-
mum rents or of adjusting the frozen rent.' Some of these supple-
mentary techniques are discussed in the following sections.
"Last Rent."-As noted above, one difficulty with the maximum
rent date method is that the particular premises may not have been
rented on that date. One way to solve this is to provide that in such
a situation the last rent prior to the critical date shall be the maximum
rent. Thus the British Acts provide that where the dwellinghouse
was not let on August 3, 1914 or September 1, 1939, as the case may
be, "the rent at which it was last let before that date" shall be the
standard rent.53 The difficulty with this provision is that there is no
limitation on the reference back; theoretically, at least, it is possible to
refer back to "some almost prehistoric letting" 54 to find the "last rent."
This can be remedied by providing for an adjustment of a rent fixed in
this manner, or by fixing a limit on the time within which a "last rent"
may be found. This latter expedient was employed in the District of
Columbia Emergency Rent Act, which provides that where accommoda-
tions were not rented on January 1, 1941, but had been rented within
the year ending on that date, the last rent within such year should
control.55 The OPA regulations provided a two-month period.56
Property First Rented After Maximum Rent Date.-A number
of methods have been used in an attempt to apply the maximum-rent-
date system to property not rented on the freeze date, nor within the
prescribed period before that date, but first let thereafter. The problem
is a substantial one, and becomes more prevalent the longer rent con-
trol remains in effect.5T
50. OPA, FourTH Q. REP. 56 (1943). The percentage was as high as 55% in
Brownwood, Texas, but only 3% in Chicago.
51. OPA, FnH Q. REP. 42 (1943) (10%) ; SIXTH Q. REP. 46 (1943) (12%);
EIGHTH Q. REP. 58 (1944) (13%); NINTH Q. REP. 66 (1944) (14%); ELEVENTH
Q. REP. 54 (1944) (16%).
52. See Rex v. Trusts & Guarantee Co., Ltd., [1943]. 3 W.W.R. 346 (Alberta
Dist. Ct) (no discrimination involved because different methods used to fix maximum
rents).
53. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, 10 & 11
Geo. V., c.17, § 12(1) (a) ; Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1939, 2 & 3
Geo. VI, c. 71, First Schedule.
54. Davies v. Warwick, [1943] 1 K.B. 329, 332 (C.A.), per Scott, L.J. In this
case the "last rent" under the 1939 Act was a 1916 rent.
55. District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, §2(1) (b), D.C. CODE, tit. 45,
§1602(1) (b) (Supp. 1949).
56. Rent Regulation for Housing, § 4(b).
57. See notes 50, 51, mtpra.
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A rather draconian solution is not to control such rents at all.
While this might assist in getting additional accommodations on the
rental market, on the whole it seems to be a matter of throwing out the
baby with the bath-water. This plan has not been widely employed, but
instances of its use may be found. In some cases this seems to have
been a pure oversight; " elsewhere, control has been deliberately con-
fined to existing leases, thus not only leaving new lettings uncontrolled
but even decontrolling existing accommodations if the tenant vacated.59
This latter scheme of course cannot work over any extended period and
it has usually been abandoned after a short time," except where it has
been deliberately employed as a decontrol or tapering-off device."'
A second approach is to provide that new rents shall be fixed in
accordance with some method other than the maximum-rent-date
system. For instance, it is sometimes provided that rents for newly-
let accommodations shall be determined by the "percentage" method,6'
although existing rents are frozen. 3  This hybrid procedure is not to
be commended; there is too much likelihood of disparity between rents
fixed under the two methods.
A third answer to the problem is to provide that the "first rent"
shall become the maximum rent, usually, but not always, with a provi-
sion for reduction to comparable levels. The British Acts, for instance,
provide that in the case of a dwelling-house first let after August 3,
1914, or September 1, 1939, as the case may be, "the rent at which it
was first let" shall be the standard rent."4 The use of the past tense
58. E.g., Uruguay, Law of June 20, 1921; Peru, Law No. 8766 (1938). The
defect in the Peruvian law was remedied by Law No. 9186 (1940), applicable to
Arequipa Province.
59. Saulsbury Resolution, 40 STAT. 593 (1918) (District of Columbia) (only ex-
isting leases controlled); NEW YORK, LAWS OF 1920, c. 942-953 (same).
The New York laws were upheld as against the contention that they deprived
one class of tenants of equal protection of the laws. People ex rel. Durham Realty
Corp. v. LaFetra, 230 N.Y. 429 (1921). But the Saulsbury Resolution was held
unconstitutional on the ground, inter alia, that it discriminated against those landlords
whose property was already let. Willson v. McDonnell, 49 App. D.C. 280, 265 Fed.
432 (1919), app. dis. 257 U.S. 665 (1921).
60. 41 STAT. 298 (1919) (District of Columbia), (Ball Rent Law).
61. E.g., New Zealand, Fair Rents Act of 1936, § 3(1) (a), (b) (houses not let
before Nov. 27, 1935 not controlled); Fair Rents Amendment Act, 1939, § 4 (houses
first let after Jan. 1, 1939 above a certain rent exempted). See also the Federal
Housing and Rent Act of 1947, discussed in Willis, The Federal Hoising and Rent
Act of 1947, 47 COL. L. Rxv. 1118 (1947).
It is sometimes provided that the rent of accommodations not rented on the max-
imum rent date may be fixed by agreement. NEw YORK, LAWS OF 1945, c. 3 and
314, §2(c) (to be fixed by agreement, arbitration or court proceedings on basis of
reasonable rent on maximum rent date plus 1517).
62. See note 2, supra.
63. Missouar, REv. STAT. ANx. § 3015.3(2) (Sept. 1947 Supp.) ; Louisiana, Acts
of 1946, No. 333; Brazil, Decree Law No. 4598, Art. 3 (1942); Kenya, No. 12 of
1940, § 2.
64. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, 10 & 11
Geo. V, c. 17, § 12(1) (a) ; Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1939, 2
& 3 Geo. VI, c. 71, First Schedule.
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in this clause does not mean that it refers only to first rents after the
maximum rent date but before the effective date of the Acts; 65 indeed,
as far as the 1939 Act is concerned such a construction would be mean-
ingless, inasmuch as the Act was passed on September 1, 1939. The
absence of any provision for adjustment downward in the British Acts,
however, meant that for accommodations first rented after the Acts
went into effect the landlord had a comparatively free hand, although
once he had set a rent he was held to it. Thus in one case a house was
let for £150 a year but the lease provided that "for the duration" the
tenant would pay £112. The court held that the standard rent was
£112 "rising to £150," commenting that whether or not a "first rent"
fixed by a landlord with his eye on the Acts should be the standard rent
was a matter of policy and not construction.66 Where the lease of a
house first let after 1939 provided for an annual rent of £200 and on
the same day that the lease was executed the landlord executed a deed
providing that since the tenant took the flat undecorated, the rent would
be reduced to £150, the court held the standard rent to be £200.67
However, an attempt to establish a first rent by a fictitious lease to an
affiliated company at an inflated rent failed." The possibility, if not
probability of profiteering where the "first rent" was agreed on during
a period of housing shortage points up a defect in the English system.69
The fourth approach, and the one that has been most widely used,
is for the maximum rent simply to be fixed by a court, commission or
other agency. The "first rent" idea may be combined with this, the
first rent being a provisional maximum rent until the court or agency
has acted. More commonly, however, the first rent is given no con-
sideration. Sometimes, letting of the property is forbidden until a
rent is fixed.
65. See Dunlop v. McGeehan, [1921] N.Z.L.R. 1026.
A distinction may be made between premises first let between the maximum rent
date and the effective date, and premises let thereafter. See Ceylon, Ordinance No.
60 of 1942, §§5(2)(c), (d).
66. Tedman v. Whicker, 170 L.T. 51, 60 T.L.R. 107 (C.A. 1943).
67. White v. Richmond Court, Ltd., 60 T.L.R. 391 (C.A. 1944).
68. Conqueror Property Trust Ltd. v. Barnes Corp., 60 T.L.R. 75 (KB. 1943).
Compare Colombia, Resolution No. 50 of 1943 of the Interventorio de Precios (first
rent will be accepted as the maximum only if the tenant has occupied for six months).
69. Under the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. VI,
c. 40, § 1 (1949), the Rent Tribunals set up under the Furnished Houses (Rent Con.
trol) Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 34, are empowered to fix the "reasonable rent"
for accommodations first let after September 1, 1939.
In Cheir v. J. N. Moeseri et Cie., 12 Gaz. des Tribs. Mixtes d'Egypte 107 (Trib.
Civ. Cairo, 1922), the court indulged in some judicial legislation and held that the
provision in Art. 27 of Law No. 4 of 1921 that, when a house was first let after
August 1, 1914, the judge should fix the maximum rent on the basis of the first rent
in preference to the evaluation by the tax authorities, should not be applied when the
first rent was at the height of the inflation, since this would result in depriving the
tenant of the benefit of the law.
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The OPA regulations originally required the landlord to file a
petition for fixation of the maximum rent of property not rented on
the maximum rent date or within two months prior thereto, and to
allow 15 days for action thereon before renting the property. If no
order was entered within 15 days, the landlord could rent the accom-
modations and the first rent would become the maximum rent, subject
to reduction to comparable levels. After a few months, however, this
was changed.70 In order to prevent delay in making housing available,
the landlord was permitted to rent the accommodations immediately;
the first rent became the maximum rent but the Administrator had the
power to decrease it to the level of rents prevailing for comparable
accommodations on the maximum rent date." The Irish Adt of 1923
was similar: the rent was to be fixed by the court, but pending applica-
tion the first rent was the standard rent.72 Canada, however, reversed
the process. Under the original regulations, the first rent was the
maximum rent, subject to reduction to "comparability," but this was
changed in December, 1942, and thereafter the rent was fixed by the
rent.control authorities ab initio, on a comparability basis.
73
In order to prevent evasion of the rent laws in the case of newly-
rented accommodations, provision must be made for prompt registra-
tion of such leases, or the authorities must be empowered to make a
retroactive determination of the maximum rent. To require approval
of the rent before the premises may be rented at all is too drastic a
remedy, since it results in keeping housing off the market. The OPA
required filing of a registration statement within thirty days; if the
landlord without adequate excuse failed to file within that time, all rents
received by him were subject to refund in case of a later reduction.
7 4
The Rent Administrator for the District of Columbia, however, did not
have as free a hand as the OPA Administrator. The District of
Columbia Act provided that the rent for accommodations not let on
January 1, 1941, nor within the year prior to that date, should be the
rent fixed by the Administrator on the basis of comparable rents,
75
70. Supplementary Amendment No. 4, 7 FED. REG,. 7534, 10081 (1942). See OPA,
FouT= Q. REP. 58-9 (1943).
71. Rent Regulation for Housing, §4(c), (d), (e).
These provisions for reduction were reasonable and were authorized by the Emer-
gency Price Control Act. Beatrice S. Woolf, 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3085 (1944).
72. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1923, No. 19 of
1923, § 2(1) (b). The rent fixed by the court need not bear any relation to the first
letting: Gaffney v. O'Donnell, 60 Ir. L.T.R. 38 (1926).
73. WARTIME PRIcES & TRADE BOARD, Order No. 108, § 3, as amended by Order
No. 211; Order No. 294, § 10.
74. Rent Regulation for Housing, §§ 4 (e), 7.
75. District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, mipra note 55, § 2(1) (c).
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the result being that, until the Administrator determined the maximum
rent, the landlord could charge what he pleased.
76
Where the maximum rent for newly-rented housing is fixed by a
court or board, the standard-if any is prescribed-is usually the rent
of comparable accommodations. 77  In some statutes the standard is
more vaguely defined as "what the property might reasonably be
expected to have rented for" on the maximum rent date; 78 but the
two standards amount to the same thing since the best evidence on
the issue would be what similar properties actually did rent for.
Special provision is sometimes made for new construction, in
order not to deter building and to make due allowance for increased
costs of construction. Under OPA, the maximum rent for priority-
constructed housing (practically the only type of housing that could be
built during the war) was fixed by FHA.79  Rents for this type of
housing were substantially above comparable levels for pre-war hous-
ing. o The Canadian regulations were amended in 1947 to provide
that, for housing completed by original construction or by structural
alteration before January 1, 1944, the rent should be fixed at 110% of
the comparable rents on the maximum rent date (October 11, 1941);
for housing completed after January 1, 1944, the maximum rent was
to be fixed at an amount which would "yield a fair return, based on
76. The Administrator in General Order No. 1, 70 Wash. L. Rep. 105 (1942)
provided that it would be assumed but not conceded that the first rent was fair and
reasonable, but that the landlord would have to file a petition for determination of
rent. This was superseded by General Order No. 6, 70 Wash. L. Rep. 873 (1942),
which proclaimed that the ceiling would be zero until the petition was filed, and that
upon its filing the first rent would be the ceiling, but this was held invalid because such
a determination was not based upon the rent charged for comparable accommodations
as required by the Act, Van Mechelen v. Block, D.C. Munic. Ct. No. 420,644 (Sept. 2,
1943). G.O. No. 6 was then superseded by G.O. No. 11 (1943) which merely re-
quired the filing of an applikation. The court held that the Administrator's determina-
tion was not retroactive. Moore v. Coats, 40 A.2d 68 (D.C. Munic. App. 1944);
Dekelbaum v. Lloyd, 41 A.2d 174 (D.C. Munic. App. 1945). See also Sager v.
Stamps, 38 A.2d 113 (D.C. Munic. App. 1944).
77. New York, Laws of 1945, ch. 314, § 2(c) (comparability or other satisfactory
evidence) ; France, Law of April 30, 1926, Art. 10, Decree of Feb. 28, 1941, Art. 1.
78. Ireland: Act No. 19 of 1923, [1923] PUBLIC STrUTES OF THE OIREACHTAS
522, § 2(1) (b) ; see COGHLAN, LAW OF RENT REsT E iON IN Eraz, 8 (1945) (this
section set out no standards, but the practice was to introduce evidence as to what
would have been a reasonable rent in 1914 for the house as it existed at that time) ;
Act No. 4 of 1946, [1946] PUBLIC STATUTES OF THE OIREACHTAS 70, § 16 (rent to be
fixed by court on basis of rent which might reasonably have been expected in the year
ending May 7, 1941); Belgium: Decree Law of March 12, 1945, Art. 37, see also
Report of the Minister of Justice, Moniteur Beige, March 15, 1945, 1477 (court should
consider present state of the premises, not their state in 1939).
79. Rent Regulation for Housing, § 4(f). Honolulu Ordinance No. 941, § 3A was
similar.
See SEN. REP. No. 86, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), quoting testimony
of the National Housing Administrator. FHA fixed rents on a economic return
basis so as to allow 6Yt% return on the landlord's investment, after allowance of
operating and maintenance expenses and taxes, anti with an allowance also for vacancy
and collection losses.
80. Parkview, Inc., 3 OPA Op. & Dec. 3374 (1945); see Ray E. White, 2 OPA
Op. & Dec. 3207 (1945) (purpose of § 4(f) to encourage new construction).
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prevailing costs of land, labour and material." " New construction is
frequently exempted altogether.8 2
When the rent on the freeze date is unknown, which may fre-
quently be the case when that date is in the distant past, 3 the common
provision, when there is one, provides for the maximum rent to be
fixed on the basis of comparability.8 4
Effect of Change in Accommodations or in Terms of Tenancy.-
Difficulty arises when changes in the accommodation or in the terms of
tenancy have been or are made after the maximum rent date. Does
the old rent still apply or are the premises to be treated as if they were
new accommodations?
Reconstruction may, if the governing law so provides, work a
complete decontrol of the accommodations." For the purposes of the
present discussion, however, it will be assumed that reconstructed prem-
ises are still controlled, and that the question is only one of how to
determine the rent. The question has arisen frequently in the United
81. WARTIME PRICES AND TRADE BOARD, Order No. 707 (1947), amending Order
No. 294, §§ 10(6), (9). See W.P.T.B. Report 50 (1946) (increased construction
costs were taken account of even before the amendment). New housing was exempted
after June 19, .1947 by Order No. 742 (1947).
82. E.g., N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 8534, 8535 (McKinney, 1949) ; Great Britain:
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 GEo.
V, c. 7, § 8; Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, 1920,
10 & 11 GEO. V, c. 17, § 12(9) ; Ireland: Act No. 4 of 1946, [1946] PUBLIC STATUTES
OF THE OIREAcHTAs 70, § 3(2) (b) ; Belgium: Law of August 14, 1920, Art. 11; Luxem-
bourg: Law of March 21, 1947, Art. 1; Brazil: Decree Law No. 6739, Art. 12 (1944) ;
Italy: D.L. No. 370, Art. 14 (1919) ; Italy: R.D. No. 8, Art. 12; South Africa: Law
No. 13 of 1920, § 13; United States: 61 STAT. 197 (1947), 50 App. U.S.C. § 1892(c) (3)
(1946 Supp.).
83. In England rents may be fixed by reference to a 'date as far back as August
3, 1914, or even earlier, where the "last rent" is used, see note 53, supra.
84. England: Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933,
23 & 24 GEO. V, c. 32, § 6. The court cannot consider comparable rents if it is pos-
sible to ascertain the rent on the critical date, Chamberlain v. Farr, [1942] 2 All E.R.
567 (C.A. 1942). The amendment was suggested in the REPORT, INTER-DEPARTMENTAL
COMMITTE ON THE RENT RESTRICTION ACTS, Cmd. 3911, p. 52 (1931).
In Ireland it was held that, in the absence of proof of the rent on August 3, 1914,
the standard rent could not be fixed at all. O'Neill v. Martin, 69 Ir. L.T.R. 63 (1935).
See also Tyson v. Munns, Ir. Jur. Rep. 77 (1938) ; Leigh v. O'Byrne, Ir. fur. Rep. 53
(1935) ; REPORT, TowN TENANTS TRIBUNAL 19-20 (Dublin, 1941), criticizing this
situation as absurd. The defect was corrected in the Emergency Powers (No. 313)
Order, 1944 (Stat. Rules and Orders, 1944, No. 29), § 4(1) and by the 1946 Act,
which does not refer back to 1914 and does not rely solely upon the rent on a given
date.
Canada: WARTIME PRICES AND TRADE BOARD, Order No. 294 § 10(9); Shanghai:
Ordinance of April 1, 1946.
United States: Rent Regulation for Housing, § 5(d).
85. E.g., Great Britain, Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions)
Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Gao. V, c. 17, § 12(9) ; Ireland, PUB. GEN. ACTs OF 1923, No. 19,
§ 3 (5) (houses "bona fide reconstructed by way of conversion into two or more sepa-
rate anti self-contained flats or tenements" exempted from control) ; Belgium, Law of
August 14, 1920, Art. 11, Law of Feb. 20, 1923. Art.'23. Law of Dec. 28. 1926. Art. 2.
§ 3.
The Housing and Rent Act of 1947 exempted "additional housing accommoda-
tions created by conversion on or after February 1, 1947," 61 STAT. 197 (1947), 50
U.S.C. App. § 1892 (1950). See Willis, The Federal Houshig and Rent Act of
1947, 47 COL. L. REv. 1118, 1120 (1947).
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States and in the British Isles, as well as in other countries, but is
specifically covered by legislation in only a few jurisdictions.
Under the British Acts, as we have seen, where an accommodation
is first let after the maximum rent date, the "first rent" becomes the
standard rent. Where there is a maximum-rent-date rent, however,
the court in appropriate cases may order an apportionment.8 6 It must
do so "where a dwelling-house to which the principal Acts apply is
part of another dwelling-house to which those Acts apply." 8T The
English courts have attempted to draw a distinction between the crea-
tion of a new "dwelling-house" in fact by alteration, and the creation
of a new "dwelling-house" in law by a mere change in the manner of
letting; where there has been substantial alteration, the first rent of
the new accommodation will be the standard rent," but if there has not
been, the rent must be determined by apportionment., 9
In the United States, the problem is best illustrated in the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Delsnider v. Gould.9" There, the landlord after the maximum rent
date had purchased a miserable frame building then rented at $15.50 a
month. The house had no water, no plumbing, no electricity, and was
generally in bad condition; it was heated by kerosene stoves. The new
owner installed water, plumbing and electricity, put in a bathroom,
finished the walls, installed an electric refrigerator and an electrically-
controlled kerosene furnace, rebuilt the front entrance, planted flowers
in the yard, repainted the house, laid a new floor in the living room,
supplied screens and completely furnished the house. She subsequently
rented it at $100 a month, and the Rent Administrator later determined
that the rent generally prevailing for comparable accommodations was
$85. This order was revoked upon the discovery that the original
house had been rented for $18.50 on the maximum rent date, and the
86. British Act of 1920, supra note 85, § 12(3).
87. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1938, 1 & 2
GEo. VI, c. 26, § 5.
88. Marchbank v. Campbell, [1923] 1 K.B. 245. The question is whether the
identity of the original accommodations has been destroyed. See Phillips v. Barnett,
[1922] 1 K.B. 222 (C.A. 1921); Harte v. Byrne, 76 Ir. L.T.R. 4 (Eire High Court
1941) (house let as a dwelling in 1914; later reconstructed and let as a shop, house
and premises; held, 1914 rent did not control); Boyle v. Fitzsimons, [1926] I.R.
378, 60 Ir. L.T.R. 122; Doucette v. Pascal, [1943] 3 D.L.R. 349 (Nova Scotia Sup.
Ct. 1943).
89. See Phillips v. Barnett, [1922] 1 K.B. 222 (three houses converted into a
factory; first rent held standard rent) ; Sinclair v. Powell, [1922] 1 K.B. 393 (C.A.
1921) (house bona fide converted into three apartments in 1916; same holding);
Stockham v. Easton, [1924] 1 K.B. 52 (1923) (entire house reconstructed; par-
ticular floor involved had not been greatly changed although it had been indirectly
benefited by the improvements to the house as a whole; same holding); cf. Wood-
ward v. Samuels, [1920] W.N. 82, 89 L.J.K.B. 689 (three-story house converted into
three separate flats without substantial reconstruction; 1914 rent apportioned to
determine new rent).
90. 154 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
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tenant then brought an action to recover the difference between that
amount and the rent which he had paid. The Municipal Court held
for the tenant. The Municipal Court of Appeals affirmed on the theory
that the reconstruction did hot make the house a different accommoda-
tion from the one rented on the maximum rent date." The United
States Court of Appeals reversed the Municipal Court of Appeals. It
held that under the Act "the unit for which a rent ceiling was fixed is
not the real estate, or the premises, but the combination of real estate,
all personal property, all facilities and all services connected with the
use or occupancy and for which the rent was payable." Whether
particular housing accommodations are new ones not rented on the
critical date, or are old ones with substantial capital improvements,
the court said, was a question of fact; but in the instant case only one
conclusion was possible, that the accommodations were not the "same."
Different tests were employed by the OPA. Under the regula-
tions, the maximum rent for housing accommodations changed after
the maximum rent date so as to result in an increase or decrease of
the number of dwelling units in such accommodations was the first
rent after the change, subject to reduction to comparable levels.9'
Where the accommodations had been substantially changed after the
maximum rent date, but before the effective date of regulation, by "a
major capital improvement as distinguished from ordinary repair, re-
placement and maintenance," the same was true; 11 but the making of
major capital improvements after the effective date was the basis only
for an adjustment of rent. 4  The OPA itself did not agree with the
theory of the Delsnider case. In one case, for instance, a landlord
of three cold-water flats with shared toilet facilities, no bathrooms,
no heat, no refrigeration and no kitchen facilities remodeled the ac-
commodations at a cost of some $7800. Bathrooms and kitchens were
installed in each unit, fireplaces and bookcases built in, hanging dressers
and clothes closets installed, steam heat and hot water supplied, addi-
tional electric outlets and fixtures put in, and all rooms repainted and
91. Gould v. Delsnider, 42 A.2d 140 (D.C. Muni. App. 1945).
92. Rent Regulation for Housing, §§ 4(d), (e).
Cost of improvements and refurnishing need not be taken into account in re-
ducing the first rent. Mrs. C. E. Howland, 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3269 .(1944).
93. Id., § 4(d).
94. Id., § 5(a) (1). Adjustment was also permitted where a major capital im-
provement had been made on or prior to the maximum rent date and the rent on
the maximum rent date was fixed by a lease in effect at the time of the improve-
ment. § 5(a) (2).
Some difference in practical result was possible, depending upon whether a case
came under § 4(d) or § 5(a) (1). In § 4(d) cases the rent was subject to reduction
to comparable levels, but in cases involving a major capital improvement the meas-
ure of adjustment was "the amount the Administrator finds would have been on
the maximum rent date, the difference in the rental value of the housing accommo-
dations by reason of such change." § 5, second unnumbered paragraph.
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redecorated. The landlord contended that the first rent became the
maximum rent, subject to reduction, because the accommodations were
"newly-constructed." " The Administrator rejected the argument,
stating that "the subject units retained their essential identity although
greatly improved by a major capital improvement." 16 The Adminis-
trator conceded that in some cases a reconstruction might result in the
creation of a new accommodation; "For example, a 'new' unit might
be created by a change in the perimeter walls so as to encompass a
substantially greater or lesser area within the unit." 17 The particular
question seems not to have been passed upon by the courts.
It is possible for living accommodations to be substantially changed
without physical reconstruction, and probably the same tests should be
used as in the case of reconstruction. The question has not often
arisen. In an English case, the second and third floors of a house
were let separately on the maximum rent date, as well as two rooms
on the first floor. Subsequent to passage of the rent control laws, four
rooms on the first floor were let to a tenant. It was held that the
first rent of these four rooms was the standard rent; the rent of the
entire house could not be apportioned because there was no such rent.9"
In a converse case, a house was let in two separate parts on the maxi-
mum rent date. Later the entire house was let to a single tenant at
a smaller rent than the former total, and it was held that the latter be-
came the standard rent for the house as a unit. 9 The OPA held that
where a house had been rented as a unit, but after the maximum rent
date the landlord reserved an apartment for himself and rented the
rest of the house, a new dwelling unit was created and the first rent
controlled. 00 In a District of Columbia case it was held that adding
the use of kitchen facilities did not make an apartment a new accom-
95. Rents for "newly constructed" accommodations were fixed under § 4(e);
the first rent became the maximum rent, subject to reduction to comparable levels.
In the instant case, adjustments had been ordered increasing the pre-reconversion
rents approximately 100%, but the landlord argued that the adjustment should have
been made by reducing the first rent. The difference was that under §5(a) (1) the
landlord would be entitled to charge only the old rent until the effective date of
the adjustment order, whereas under § 4(e) he would have been required to refund
only the excess over the adjusted rent. 4 OPA Op. & Dec. 3296, n.2 (1946).
96. Louise S. Austin, 4 OPA Op. & Dec. 3295 (1946).
97. See W. Adolph Peters, 3 OPA Op. & Dec. 3491 (1946).
98. Lelyveld v. Peppercorn, [1924] 2 K.B. 638. Cf. Quinn v. Redmond,
[1939] I.R. 74 (in the same situation the maximum rent was determined, under the
Irish Act, by adding to the 1914 rent of the rooms then let, the standard rent for
the remainder as determined by the court).
99. Vaughan v. Shaw, [1945] 2 All E.R. 52 (C.A.). Cf. Jennings v. Kennedy
& Co., Ltd., [1940] Ir. Jur. Rep. 9 (where house consists of rooms let separately
in 1914, standard rent of whole is sum of standard rent of parts). This decision
is criticized in COGHLAN, LAW OF RENT REsnucTIoN IN EIE 13 (1945) on the
ground that there is a greater demand for small holdings.
100. Mignon A. Weber, 3 OPA Op. & Dec. 3468 (1945).
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modation or authorize the landlord to increase the rent without apply-
ing to the Rent Administrator. 101
Under the original OPA regulations, a change from unfurnished
to furnished after the effective date of regulation did not permit the
landlord to increase the rent until the Administrator had granted an
adjustment.'0 2 This was changed to provide that where accommoda-
tions were changed from unfurnished to fully furnished after July 1,
1943, or after the effective date of regulation, whichever was later,
the first rent would become the maximum rent, subject to reduction
to comparable levels.'0 3  The effect of this was to place accommoda-
tions changed from unfurnished to fully furnished on the same footing
as accommodations first rented after the maximum rent date.'0 4  A
similar result was reached by the District of Columbia courts under the
ruling in the Delsnider case. 0 5 In several jurisdictions laws have
specifically provided that the maximum rent should be fixed by a com-
mission or court when the premises were changed from unfurnished to
furnished.0 6
101. Lumpkin v. Ryan, 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 5213 (D.C. Muni. Ct. 1945). See
also Sawyer v. Warner, 63 A.2d 683 (D.C. Muni. App. 1948) (jury could decide
that change from "rooms" to an "apartment" did not give rise to new housing accom-
modations, nor did addition of a refrigerator and giving of exclusive use of a
bathroom in place of a former non-exclusive use).
102. See Statement accompanying Amendment No. 2 to Rent Regulation for
Housing, OPA SERv. 200: 280 (1943).
103. Amendment No. 2 to Rent Regulation for Housing, 8 FED. RFG. 9020
(1943), adding §4(j) to Rent Regulation for Housing. This provision applied
where apartments were constructed with an FHA priority rating under which max-
imum unfurnished rents were fixed, and the landlord first rented the apartments fur-
nished. Womack v. Bowles, 146 F.2d 497 (E.C.A. 1944), this was already the rule
as to such changes made after the maximum rent date but before the effective date of
regulation. Rent Regulation of Housing, § 4(d) (3), (e).
A fictitious sale of the furniture by the landlord to the manager of the apart-
ment house did not convert the accommodations from furnished to unfurnished so
that the first rent thereafter (after the maximum rent date but before the effective
date) became the maximum rent. Taylor v. United States, 142 F.2d 808 (9th Cir.
1944).
In decreasing a "first rent" where the accommodations were changed to furnished
between the maximum rent date and the effective date of regulation, OPA took the
higher of (1) the rent generally prevailing for comparable accommodations on the
maximum rent date; (2) the actual maximum-rent-date-rent plus the difference in
rental value as of that date by reason of the change. Mrs. F. A. Chamberlain, 1 OPA
Op. & Dec. 1530 (1943).
104. Adding a refrigerator to an unfurnished apartment is not enough to come
within this rule, Thierry v. Gilbert, 147 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1945), affirming Gilbert v.
Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235 (D. Mass. 1944).
105. Supra note 92, et seq. See Norris v. Rael, 47 A.2d 766 (D.C. Munic. App.
1946) (at least a question for the jury whether furnishing an unfurnished apartment
might make it a new and different accommodation) ; Janes v. Noorbolm, 47 A.2d 105
(D.C. Munic. App. 1946) (tenant of a $37.50-a-month apartment entitled as a matter
of law to receive $190 a month from subtenants to whom she had let it furnished
with linen service, janitor service, heat, electricity and other utilities, until the Rent
Administrator fixed a maximum rent).
106. E.g., Belgium, Law of Feb. 20, 1923, Art. 8; Jamaica, No. 17 of 1944, §§ 9,
11; see South Australia, Act No. 29 of 1939, § 8 (increase of 8% of value of furniture
allowed where furniture added after passage of Act; query as to accommodations
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In the case of commercial accommodations, changes in the terms
of the tenancy may be so extensive as to make the former rent in-
applicable. This is illustrated by a New York case, in which, just
prior to the passage of the commercial rent laws, the parties had made
a new lease giving the tenant the additional right to conduct a "lunch-
eonette," giving him the exclusive right to run a drug store and
luncheonette in the building, providing for alterations and improve-
ments by the landlord and allowing the tenant to make other changes.
The court held that the rent on the freeze date did not control, but that
the case came under a section of the law dealing with changes in the
accommodations, and was similar to the situation where the space was
not rented on the freeze date.10 7  As might be expected, the common
practice when accommodations have been converted from commercial
to residential or vice versa is to fix the rent on a comparability basis.0
Subleases.-Legislators have varied in their approach to the prob-
lem of subletting. At one extreme, they have left subtenants unpro-
tected; 109 at the other extreme, they have prohibited subletting en-
tirely.110  Between these two extremes there is considerable variation.
A good many laws forbid the tenant to sublet at a rent higher
than that which he is paying."' Where the subletting is partial, the
rent is to be proportionate to the part sublet." 2 Sometimes, this re-
striction applies only to total subletting, and quite frequently it applies
only to a subletting of unfurnished premises. The OPA regulations
changed to furnished between the maximum rent date and the effective date);
Colombia, Resolution No. 169 (1945) (approval of price control office required before
rent could be increased on account of furniture).
107. Lang v. Resiberg, N.Y.LJ., March 16, 1946.
108. WARTIME PRIcES & TRADE BOARD, Order No. 294, § 10; Order No. 315,
§ 10. The comparability provision was deleted by Order No. 707 (1947). See also
Zervudachi c. Israel, 12 Gaz. des Tribs. Mixtes d'Egypte 54 (Trib. Somm. Cairo,
1921) ; Galanou c. Marcopoulo, id. 22 (same); Suares Freres & Co. c. Popolani, id.
115 (Trib. Civ. Cairo, 1922).
109. See REPORT OF THE RENT COMMISSlON, 12 L'Egypte Contemporaine 114,
123 (1921) (partial subletting should be allowed and rents not controlled, in order to
encourage subletting).
110. E.g., Spain, Decree Law of Dec. 30, 1944, Art. 1 (total subletting of unfur-
nished dwellings prohibited); Albania, Law No. 76, Art. 2 (1945) (total subletting
prohibited). A good many other laws prohibit subletting except with the written
authorization of the landlord; but on the other hand some laws permit subletting
even where the lease forbids it, e.g., Italy, R.D.L. No. 1624, ART. 2 (1924). In
Poland, a tenant is required to sublet excess space. Decree of Dec. 21, 1945.
111. E.g., District of Columbia (Ball Rent Act), 41 STAT. 298, §118 (1919)
(permission of Rent Commission required for sublease at higher rent); H.R. 11563,
74th Cong., § 17 (same); Austria, Law of June 22, 1929, see EUROPEAN HOUSING
PaROBEMs 381 (I.L.O., 1930) (unfurnished subletting only); Portugal, Decree No.
5411, Art. 109 (1919) ; Belgium, Law of Aug. 14, 1920, Art. 7 (unfurnished only);
Brazil, Decree Law No. 9669, Art. 7 (1946). See also Umersey v. Damji, 45 Ind.
L.R. (Bombay) 744 (1920) (act fixes only one standard rent for particular prem-
ises; there cannot be one standard rent as between landlord and tenant and another
as between tenant and subtenant; profiteering at expense of subtenant condemned).
112. See Puerto Rico, Act No. 464, § 16 (1946); Brazil, supra note 111 (pro-
portional to area occupied and situation in the building).
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contained no specific provisions on this subject, but sublettings were
treated as no different from other leases, and the rent could not be
increased. 113
Other laws permit the tenant to increase the rent by a specified
percentage either in all cases of subletting, or in case of a partial
and/or furnished subletting." 4  The right to charge an increased rent
may be restricted to cases of partial subletting. The British Acts, for
instance, permit an increase of 10% of the net rent of the sublet
part. 
5
Obviously, if the tenant supplies the furniture he should be al-
lowed to charge something above the rent he has to pay, if he is al-
lowed to sublet at all. Many laws recognize this. In Austria, no
increase was allowed on an unfurnished subletting, but if the accommo-
dation were sublet furnished and with services the law required only
that the rent be "reasonable." We are told that the legislature wanted
to protect the actual tenant and let him derive a financial advantage
from the subtenant "who generally belongs to a wealthier class."
Subletting was the only resource of many people in the bad times
following World War I, and the monthly rent of a subletting often
amounted to many times the annual rent of the main letting."' In
Northern Ireland, a partial subtenant could apply to the court to
declare his rent excessive or fair and reasonable, but this applied only
to unfurnished sublettings."
17
113. See Interpretation 4(a)-II (1942).
114. E.g., Italy, R.D.L. No. 1, Art. 4 (1920) (increase of 25% if unfurnished,
50% if furnished); Italy, D.L.L. No. 669, Art. 16 (1945) (rent for subletting un-
furnished apartment cannot exceed rent owed landlord by main tenant by more than
20%o; rent for subletting part of apartment with right to use all or part of the
"ambienti" and common services limited to 50% above proportionate amount of main
tenant's rent corresponding to number of rooms sublet; where subletting is with furni-
ture, figures are 100% and 1307 respectively); Luxembourg, Law of Feb. 25, 1927,
Art. 2 (subtenant could be required to pay up to 125% of main rent); Argentina,
Civil Code Art. 1583, as amended by Law No. 11156 (1921) (20% above main rent);
see also the complicated provisions in Spain, Law of Dec. 31, 1946, Arts. 16, 17.
115. Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1923, 13 & 14 GEo. V, c.
32, § 7(1). The landlord can require up to 5% to be passed on to him. But under
the Second Schedule to the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions)
Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEo. VI, c. 26, if the subtenant becomes the tenant he is required
to pay only 57 over the original tenant's rent. This section does not apply to houses
brought under control by the 1939 Act.
See also Chile, Decree No. 239, Art. 3 (1942); Decree No. 794, Art. 3 (1944)
(where tenant sublets one or more rooms and lives in the house and takes care of it
in person, he may charge subtenant an extra 20% for costs of light and other services) ;
Paraguay, Decree Law No. 8025 (1948) (tenant may charge increased rent only if
he occupies part of house).
116. EUROPEAN HOUSING PROBLEms 381 (I.L.O. 1923). See also Hungary, Order
No. 2222 (1923); EUROPEAN HOUSING PROBLEMS 433 (increase of 1007 to 150%
allowed) ; Spain, Decree Law of Dec. 30, 1944, Art. 1 (25% markup), superseded by
Law of Dec. 31, 1946.
117. Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act (Northern Ireland), 1932
22 & 23 GFaO. V, c. 14, § 8; Rent & Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1940 4 & 5
Gao. VI, c. 7, § 20.
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Some laws require the tenant to pass on to the landlord a part of
the benefit of the subletting. This is fair enough, since the presence
of more occupants means greater wear and tear on the building." 8
The British Acts permit the tenant to make an increase of 10% of
the net rent of the part sublet, but also allow the landlord to increase
the rent of that part 5%.:1'9 A French law provided that a tenant
who had sublet without the landlord's permission had to pay an aug-
mentation in rent proportional to the benefits realized. 20 In Belgium,
if the rent paid by the subtenants exceeded the rent paid by the tenant
for the entire property (making an allowance for the part occupied
by the tenant) the landlord was entitled to half of the excess. 2 ' In
Spain, it is not cqnsidered subletting or boarding if one or two people,
not related to the tenant, together with their children, share the
tenant's apartment; but if there are more than two, the tenant must
pay an additional 10%o rent for each one. 2 The Italian law of 1945
contains extremely complicated provisions for rent increases in case
of subletting; the increases may vary from 10% to 150%, depending
on whether the subletting is partial or total, furnished or unfurnished,
by virtue of contract or in derogation thereof, and whether or not
speculation is involved. 23
Little if any justification can be found for allowing an increase
of rent on a total subletting where the tenant provides no furniture or
services; the tenant in such a case is a mere middleman and an in-
crease would be an unjustified burden on the subtenant. The case
may be different where a partial subletting is involved; in times of
housing shortage it is in the public interest to encourage partial sub-
letting, and in such situations the tenant usually performs some man-
agement functions and supplies some services to the subtenants. If
the tenant has furnished the apartment himself, of course he should be
given a fair amount as rent for the furniture.
Where the premises were sublet on the maximum rent date, what
is the maximum rent? Is it the rent paid to the landlord by the tenant,
or the rent paid to the tenant by the subtenant? Or are there two
maximum rents? The question seems not to have been faced in many
jurisdictions. In an early English case, a "public house" had been
let to a brewery company in 1911 for £130 a year. On the freeze
118. Increased wear and tear may be ground for an individual rent adjustment.
119. See note 115 supra.
120. Law of March 31, 1922, Art. 1.
121. Law of Dec. 28, 1926, Art. 17.
122. Law of Dec. 31, 1946, Art. 27.
123. D.L.L. No. 669, Art. 3 (1945). In case of dispute the arbitral commission
fixes the amount of the increase considering the location and construction of the
building, the date on which rents were stabilized, and the return which the tenant
obtained from the subletting and the number of dwelling units sublet.
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date, August 3, 1914, the premises were occupied under a sublease
at £24 a year, the disparity being due to the fact that the establish-
ment was a "tied house." Later, the subtenant became the tenant,
holding directly under the owner. The court held that the standard
rent was £24, on the theory that the standard rent was the rent paid
by an occupying tenant.124  The Court of Appeals affirmed, question-
ing whether this principle would hold in every case, but saying that
where it was a question between the landlord and a tenant who was
in occupation on the maximum rent date, the standard rent was the
rent the tenant was paying at that time.' 25  The result seems unjust to
the owner; he had no direct relationship with the subtenant on the
maximum rent date and there is no reason why he should have been
deprived of the benefit of his bargain because the tenant had chosen
to sublet at a lower rent than he was paying.
The case just discussed is, of course, an atypical one; ordinarily
the rent under the sublease is higher than the rent the main tenant
is paying. If the theory of the maximum rent date method is to
freeze conditions in effect on that date, it would seem that the rent
under the sublease should control, since normally it will be later in
date than the original lease; this is no hardship to the tenant, and
it gives the landlord the benefit of the rent actually being paid. Of
course, while the main lease remains in effect the landlord cannot raise
the rent of the original tenant; there is only one maximum rent, but
the rent fixed in the original lease may be less. This view was adopted
by OPA in the case of total subletting. 126  The Canadian regulations
were the same.127  In a New York case, however, where commercial
premises had been let at a rent of 10 for each ton of coal weighed
on scales on the premises, and sublet at $500 a month, the rent pay-
able under the sublease was held not the basic rent.1S
Where the premises are let unfurnished and sublet furnished,
there may be two maximum rents: one for the unfurnished premises
and one for the same premises furnished.
129
124. Glossop v. Ashley, [1921] 2 K.B. 451. Cf. Cleary v. Stuart, [1941] Ir. R.
128.
125. Glossop v. Ashley, [1922] 1 K.B. 1 (C.A. 1921). Public houses were sub-
sequently excepted from the Acts.
126. OPA Interpretation 4(a)-II.
127. WARTImE PRICES & TRADE BoA D, Order No. 294, § 4(2) (b); Order No.
315, § 4(2) (b) (maximum rent under sublease becomes maximum rent if same ac-
commodations, furniture, services, etc., are provided).
128. City of New York v. Interboro Fuel Corp., 56 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Term
1st Dep't 1945). The premises had been sold and a lease to a new tenant made
since the maximum rent date.
129. OPA Interpretation 4(a)-I, as revised July 1, 1945. Formerly, the inter-
pretation was to the contrary.
RENT CONTROL: MAXIMUM RENT DATE METHOD
Logically the result should not be any different where the sub-
letting is partial. The OPA, however, seems to have taken a dif-
ferent view. The original rent regulations provided that
Where, at the expiration or other termination of an un-
derlying lease or other rental agreement, housing accommoda-
tions or a predominant part thereof are occupied by one or more
subtenants . . . , the landlord may rent the entire premises for
use by similar occupancy for a rent not in excess of the aggre-
gate maximum rents of the separate dwelling units, or may rent
the separate dwelling units for rents not in excess of the maxi-
mum rents applicable to such units. 130
On March 1, 1943, however, this clause was revoked; underlying'
leases of structures containing more than 25 rooms rented or offered
for rent by the operating tenant were exempted from control; and
provision was made for reduction to comparable levels of rents in-
creased under the revoked provision, since the Administrator believed
that in some instances such rent was "higher than is consistent with
the general objectives of the regulations." 131 The result of the revo-
cation was apparently to freeze separately the rent under the main
lease and the rents under the sub-leases, where the structure contained
less than 25 rooms and hence was not exempted. Under the British
Acts, where a part was sublet the standard rent apparently must be
determined in all cases by apportioning the amount of the standard
rent for the entire dwelling-house, without regard to the rent actually
paid by the subtenant on the freeze date.'32
Furnished Accommodations.-Furnished accommodations are
sometimes exempted from rent control. 3 This was true, for example,
in Great Britain until a special statute was enacted in 1946; 134 the regu-
lar provisions of the Acts did not apply to "a dwelling-house bona
fide let at a rent which includes payments in respect of . . . use of
130. Rent Regulations, § 5(e) (1942).
131. OPA Amendment No. 156, 8 FED. REG. 2673; Statement Accompanying Sup-
plementary Amendment No. 15, OPA SERV. 200: 378 (1943) ; see OPA FIFTH Q. REP.
45 (1943).
132. See RENT AND MORTGAGE INTEREST RESTRICTIONs, Law Notes, 19th ed., p. 101
et seq.
Cf. Hong Kong, No. 13 of 1921, §§2(f), (g) (standard rent means rent payable
by tenant in actual occupation, i.e., occupying by self, family or servants; a tenant who
sublets part and lives in part is deemed to be tenant in actual occupation as regards the
landlord, and subtenant is deemed to be tenant in actual occupation) ; Yuet Yung Yu
v. Tseung Fat, 18 H.K.L.R. 64 (1923) (tenant paying $37 a month sublet part of
accommodations for $77 a month; court held $77 to be standard rent for the part; no
apportionment provisions in the ordinance).
133. See South Australia, Act No. 29, 1939, §2 (this provision was not carried
over in Act No. 33 of 1942) ; South Africa, Act No. 13, 1920, § 13, deleted by Act No.
26, 1940; Paraguay, Decree Law No. 2489, Art. 28 (c).
134. Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 34; see also
Rent of Furnished Houses Control (Scotland) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 GEo. VI, c. 44.
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furniture." ' Limited control was exercised in the 1920 Act (as
amended in 1939) by provisions that the landlord could not obtain a
profit more than 25%. in excess of the normal profit, i.e., the profit
which might reasonably have been expected from a similar letting on
the freeze date (1914)."' As to houses brought under control by the
1939 Act, the normal profit was determined by what might have been
obtained in the year ending Sept. 1, 1939, and no increase over the
normal profit was allowed. 8 ' Both civil and criminal penalties were
imposed on violators. 138 This limited control was found to be in-
adequate,3 9 and a different system was employed in the 1946 Act. 4 '
Where furnished lettings are not exempted, special provisions are
not usually made for them.-" The OPA, for instance, made no dis-
tinction between furnished and unfurnished accommodations as to
the method of determining the maximum rents. Over a long period
of time, however, this is likely to cause trouble because of the fact that
furniture depreciates more rapidly than real property, and because
changes in the quantity or quality of furniture supplied may easily be
made.
Some examples of special treatment of furnished accommodations
may be found.14 And in some places, the legislators have avoided
the question simply by delegating to the rent control authorities the
determination of the rents of furnished premises. While this permits
arbitrary determinations, it is probably less arbitrary than any rigid
135. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, 10 & 11
GEo. V, c. 17, § 12(2) (i) ; see also Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1939,
2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 71, § 3 (2) (b). The Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act,
1923, 13 & 14 GEo. V, c. 32, § 10 further defined the meaning of § 12(2) (i) ; and see
Property Holding Co. v. Mischeff, [1946] 2 All E.R. 294 (C.A.). For the reasons for
the exception see REPORT, SAXIsBuRY Coamm' 1f 19 (1920).
136. The proper procedure was for the court to determine the normal profit pro-
duced from a furnished letting in 1914, estimate what rent would produce that profit
at the date of the determination and add 25%. Truss v. Olivier, 40 Times L.R. 588
(1924). The 1914 practice in Scotland of doubling the unfurnished rent to arrive at
the furnished rent could be followed. Langdon v. Elliott, [1924] 2 Scot. L.T. 9
(Sheriff's Ct.).
137. Rent & Mort. Int. (Restrictions) Act, 1939, supra note 135.
138. See Jones v. Johnson, 86 Sol. J. 120 (1942).
139. REPORT, INTER-DEPARTMENTAL Comxmir ON RENT CONTROL, Cmd. 6621, 42-
43 (1945). .
140. See Willis, "Fair Rents" Systems, 16 GEo. WAsH. L. RPv. 104 (1947).
141. Questions of course arise where the accommodations are changed from un-
furnished to furnished or vice versa.
142. Kenya, No. 12, 1940, § 14 (maximum rent of furnished house is standard rent
plus a maximum of 15% of value of furniture and 25% of value of "soft furnishings",
linen, cutlery, kitchen utensils, glassware and crockery) ; Egypt, Proclamation No. 369
(1943) (furnished rent is unfurnished rent plu$ a monthly sum corresponding to equiv-
alent of usage of furniture; disputes settled by a commission) ; Rumania, Law No. 330,
Art. 8 (1946) (special coefficient for furnished accommodations by which 1945-46 rent
is multiplied); Spain, Law of Dec. 31, 1946, Art. 58 (unfurnished rent may be
doubled) ; Brazil, Decree Law No. 6739, Art. 4 (1944) (increase based either on per-
centage of unfurnished rent or percentage of value of furniture) ; Chile, Decree No.
794, Art. 4 (1944) (maximum rent of 7% on value of furniture plus 6% for normal
deterioration, security and other, contingencies).
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statutory formula. As a British Commission has pointed out,143 pro-
viding for an increase by a percentage of the amount of the unfurnished
rent will not work well, because furnished lettings vary so that no
flat percentage could apply to all; and it is difficult to decide the ap-
propriate proportion of the value of the furniture, assuming that that
value can be determined.
Progressive Rents.-Leases of commercial premises frequently
provide for periodic increases in rent during the life of the lease or
for an increase in rent on exercise of an option to renew. Similar
clauses are sometimes found in leases of residential property. What
is the maximum rent in such a situation-is the rent frozen at the
particular rate in effect on the maximum rent date, or may the stipu-
lated increases be made despite the freezing of rents generally?
On principle, the landlord should be permitted to collect the in-
creases provided for in the lease; the maximum rent date method does
not aim at freezing merely the particular rent which happened to be
in force on the critical date, but the whole rental bargain between the
landlord and the tenant. Realistically, the monthly rent under a
lease of this sort is determined by prorating the total rent under the
lease.144  For this same reason, there is no justification for allowing
the landlord to continue, after the expiration of the lease, to collect the
highest rate in effect during its currency, since this does not repre-
sent the true monthly rent.
The British Acts have recognized the first principle stated above
but not the second. Where a house is "let at a progressive rent pay-
able under a tenancy agreement or lease, the maximum rent payable
under such tenancy agreement or lease shall be the standard rent;" 145
i.e., the landlord can collect the stipulated increases during the life
of the lease and thereafter can continue to receive the highest rent
provided for in the lease. "What is meant by a 'progressive rent' is
a rent under one single tenancy and a rent which automatically rises
during the continuance of that tenancy." 146
143. See note 139 supra.
144. See 500 Fifth Avenue, Inc., 274 App. Div. 241, 80 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1st Dep't
1948) (graduated leases disregarded after expiration because rent on freeze date might
not bear proper relation to rental value) ; Isquith v. Athanas, 33A.2d 733 (D.C. Munic.
App. 1943) (where lease was made for term of years at rental payable in progres-
sively increasing monthly installments, rent is not frozen at amount payable on maxi-
mum rent date).
See also Reverdy c. Andrieu, Sirey 1921 Bull. Somm. 1:10 (France, Court of
Cassation 1920) (provision that 1914 rent shall be taken into account in fixing maxi-
mum rent did not abrogate a 12-year lease providing for quadrennial increases of rent).
145. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, 10 & 11
Gao. V, c. 17, § 12(1) (a).
146. See Wheeler v. Wirral Estates, [1935] 1 K.B. 294, 300, per Lord Wright,
M.R. More than one increase is not required to make a rent "progressive." Gold-
smith v. Orr, [1920] W.N. 250, 89 L.J.K.B. 901 (rent which was to be at a higher
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The New York Business and Commercial Rent Acts take the
more equitable approach. A lease in effect on the maximum rent date,
providing for payment of rent in a graduated scale, is given effect,
but on its expiration or other termination the maximum rent for
future lettings is to be fixed by agreement, arbitration or the court
on a comparability basis-the same methods employed where the
premises were not rented on the freeze date.' The courts have recog-
nized the policy of these provisions by holding that the fact that the
last graduation in rent took effect before the maximum rent date is
immaterial, 4 ' and that a rent is "in a graduated scale" even though
it decreases rather than increases during the life of the lease.
Inconsistently, however, the lower courts have held that these
provisions apply only to leases in force on the effective date of the
amendment, and not to leases in effect on the maximum rent date but
having expired before the amendment. 50
A lease providing for payment of a percentage of the tenant's
gross income, with a minimum of $11,500 for two years and $12,000
for three years, was held not a graduated lease because of the slight
step-up in the minimum."'
Under the OPA regulations, where the lease or other rental
agreement in effect on the maximum rent date provided for a higher
or lower rent at other periods during the term of the lease or agree-
ment, the rent was frozen at the figure charged on the critical date;
but the landlord or tenant could petition for an adjustment. 52  The
figure during final year of tenancy was not a progressive rent) was presumably over-
ruled by Bryanston Property Co., Ltd. v. Edwards, [1944] 1 K.B. 32 (C.A. 1943),
and Tedman v. Whicker, [1944] 1 K.B. 112 (C.A. 1943), holding that where a tenant
covenanted to pay a certain rent but the landlord by a special clause in the lease al-
lowed him to deduct a substantial amount each year during the war, the rent was a
"progressive" one.
147. N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAWS, §§ 8534, 8563 (McKinney's, 1949).
The courts had held, prior to the amendments, that leases in effect on the freeze
date, providing for periodic increases, were not invalidated by the acts. Ronaho Corp.
v. Morse, 186 Misc. 334, 61 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1945), (aff'd on reargument),
citing an apparently inconsistent decision in Adams v. Riker Operating Co., Inc., 270
App. Div. 755, 810 (1st Dep't 1946) (mem. opinion); 140 West 69th St. Corp. v.
Simis, 186 Misc. 342, 59 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Munic. Ct. 1945).
148. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Seconset Corp., 274 App. Div. 112, 80 N.Y.S.
2d 117 (Ist Dept. 1948) ; Grossman v. Circle Diner Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
149. 331 Madison Avenue Corp. v. Hegeman Harris Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup.
Ct. 1948).
150. 160 Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Raymond Service, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct.
1948); Traymore Apts., Inc. v. Queens Blvd. Real Estate, Inc., 80 N.Y.S.2d 790,
192 Misc. 596 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Application of Budget Holding Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d
793, 192 Misc. 594 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Application of Bryant Park Building, Inc., 193
Misc. 734, 85 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
151. Application of 500 Fifth Avenue, Inc., mpra note 144.
152. Rent Regulation for Housing, §§ 5(a) (6), 5(c) (5) ; 877 Fifth Avenue Corp.,
2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3292 (1945). Originally the rent had to be "substantially"
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adjustment could be on the basis either of comparable rents or of the
provisions of the lease.'
5 3
Specific provisions permitting leases at a progressive rent to be
carried out are found also in several parts of the British Empire, al-
though they do not always indicate how the rent is to be determined
after the expiration of the lease.'"5
Option to Renew at Increased Rent.-An option to renew at an
increased rent is not the same as a progressive rent. The landlord is
bound, but the tenant is not; and the tenant may agree to the terms
of the lease, even though the proposed increase is exorbitant, think-
ing that he will not have to exercise the option.
In a number of jurisdictions nevertheless, such an option con-
tained in a lease in effect on the maximum rent date can be exer-
cised.' 55 The New York Court of Appeals has held that a lease with
such an option is a lease for a graduated rental within the Business
Rent Law. 56 An English court, on the other hand, has ruled that
a 21-year lease determinable at the end of seven, fourteen or twenty-
one years at rentals of £45, £60 and £65 r~spectively was not a lease
at a progressive rent and that the £45 rent in effect on August 3, 1914
was the standard rent.157  The District of Columbia court has refused
to give any effect to an option to renew at a higher rent.'
Variable Rents.-Commercial leases sometimes provide for the
rent to be determined on the basis of a percentage of the tenant's
volume of business. There is no particular reason for not permitting
such leases to be carried out according to their terms, except that this
may give a windfall to the landlord who has such a lease as dis-
tinguished from an ordinary lease. The New York Business and Com-
mercial Rent Acts sanction such leases, but provide that any fixed,
basic or minimum rent may not be increased except as provided in
higher or lower, but this word was deleted by Amendment No. 67, 10 FED. REG.
11666 (1945).
This clause was inapplicable to a situation where the tenant's son had agreed
to pay a higher rent on his return from service. Andrews Equities, Inc., 5 OPA Op.
& Dec. 3254 (1947).
153. Id., § 5, third unnumbered paragraph.
154. E.g., Canada, WARtimE PRICES & TRAIE BoARD, Order No. 315, § 4(2) (e)
(commercial rents) ; Burma, Law No. 6 of 1948, § 2(f) (II) (D), § 5(1) (b) (after
expiration of lease, rent payable during last period shall be the maximum rent);
Ceylon, No. 60 of 1942, § 5(1) (2); Jamaica, No. 17 of 1944, § 9(a) (c) (rent
determined by board after expiration of lease).
155. Canada, WARTImE PRICES & TRADE BoAim, Order No. 294, § 4(2) (c);
Order No. 315, § 4(2) (c) ; South Africa, War Measure No. 42 of 1941, § 16; Act
No. 33 of 1942, § 16(1); Federated Malay States, No. 14 of 1940, § 5(i).
156. Harvey Holding Corp. v. Satter, 297 N.Y. 113, 75 N.E.2d 619 (1947).
The exact holding was that the rent was to be determined on a comparability basis
after the expiration of the lease.
157. Pond v. Barber, Estates Gazette, June 9, 1923.
158. Hicks v. Behrend, 40 A.2d 78 (D.C. Munic. App. 1944).
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the acts." 9 This provision applies even though the rent was not vari-
able on the freeze date because of a temporary modification. 6 ' The
acts do not indicate how the rent is to be determined after the expira-
tion of such a lease. 6 ' In cases not subject to the statutory
provision, 6 2 the New York courts have held that, where the rent was
fixed on a percentage basis on the maximum rent date with minimum
specified, the maximum rent is 1/12 of the annual amount paid under
the lease, i.e., the average monthly rent paid," 3 plus the statutory
increase.
The Canadian regulations permit a percentage lease to be carried
out but also fail to indicate clearly how the maximum rent is to be de-
termined on its termination. 6 An Italian law, on the other hand,
suspended all clauses in leases whereby the rent varied according to
some element, to the extent that as a result the rent exceeded that on
a given date.'65
Seasonal Variations; Seasonal Lettings.-Rents frequently are
affected by seasonal demand, or they may vary from season to season
by local custom, being higher in the winter if the landlord supplies
heat, lower if the tenant supplies it.'6 6 Purely seasonal accommoda-
tions are often exempted from control.'6 7  Where they are not, it
should be made clear that, while the rent charged for the particular
season including the maximum rent date may continue to be charged
for future seasons, the accommodations may not be let for year-round
occupancy or off-season occupancy at the high seasonal rent. Con-
versely, if the maximum rent is fixed by an off-season letting, the
landlord should not be held to it around the year. Thus under the
OPA, while certain seasonal or resort accommodations were exempt
159. Laws of 1945, c. 3, § 14 as amended by c. 315; c. 314, § 13. See Application
of 500 Fifth Avenue, Inc., 274 App. Div. 241, 80 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1948) (lease cannot
be both variable and graduated; slight step-up in the minimum does not make it a
graduated lease).
160. King Arthur Restaurant v. London Terrace, Inc., 273 App. Div. 233, 76
N.Y.S.2d 452 (1948).
161. See Matter of Cortlandt & Dey Streets Corp., 119 N.Y.L.J. 814 (Sup. Ct.
1948) -(landlord can seek determination of "fair and reasonable rent" after expiration
of variable lease; tenants had been paying the minimum amount, plus the statutory
increase, since expiration).
162. The statutory provision, note 159 supra, applies only to leases in effect
when the law was enacted and not to leases in effect on the freeze date but having
expired later. City of New York v. Interboro Fuel Corp., 185 Misc. 299, 56 N.Y.S.2d
808 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
163. City of New York v. Interboro Fuel Corp., mipra note 162; New Deal
Petroleum Corp. v. Royal Automotive Service, Inc., 118 N.Y.L.. 838 (App. Term
1947).
164. WARTIME PRICES AND TRADE BoAD,- Order No. 315, § 4(2) (e).
165. Italy, R.D.L. No. 1387 (1938), Law No. 486 (1939), Art. 13.
166. OPA Frnr Q. REP. 45 (1943).
167. E.g., Rent Regulation for Housing, § 1(b) (6); Australia, Landlord and
Tenant Regulations, S.R. 1945, No. 97, Reg. 8.
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from control during the resort season, where the rent of a particular
accommodation was frozen at a rent which was substantially higher
or lower than at other times of the year because of seasonal demand,
the Administrator could adjust it to the level generally prevailing for
comparable accommodations during the year ending on the maximum
rent date,168 or could provide for different maximum rents for different
periods of the year.169 Special provisions were made for Miami,
Florida, because of the peculiar conditions existing in that area. Rents
were frozen at the rent charged on Sept. 1, 1943, or at one-twelfth of
the total rent for the year ending August 31, 1943, whichever was
the higher; M7 but the landlord, at his option, could have his maximum
rents set on a seasonal pattern where the total rent for the eight off-
season months in the year ending August 31 was less than half of the
rent received for the four winter months, January through April. The
seasonal rents so fixed were determined on the basis of the rents
charged in the particular month of the year ending August 31, 1943.171
In Canada, where accommodations were customarily let for a
season only, the maximum rent was that payable for the last corre-
sponding season prior to the maximum rent date, but if the premises
were let for year-round occupancy the first rent became the maximum
rent if not higher than comparable levels .1
2
In the case of rents subject to seasonal variations, as distinguished
from seasonal demand, the OPA regulations were the same as those
applicable to seasonal demand described above.173  In Canada, how-
ever, the rent was not frozen at the particular sum charged on the
freeze date, but the variations were preserved.' 4
168. Rent Regulation for Housing, § 5, fifth unnumbered paragraph. In most
other cases comparability was determined as of the maximum rent date.
If no comparable accommodations could be found which had been rented year-
round, the rent could be fixed on the basis of seasonal rents for comparables sup-
plemented by off-season rents. Myrtie 0. Taylor, 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3090 (1944).
169. Id., §5(a) (7), (c) (6).
170. Miami Rent Regulation, § 4(a) ; see Jack Oberson, Docket No. RPA-IV-31-P
(OPA 1944).
171. Id., § 5(h) ; see Wasserman and Bruckner, 2 OPA Op. & Dec. 3096 (1944).
If the unit had not been rented for any particular month in the year, the Sept. 1,
1943 rent or the first rent thereafter was taken as the maximum rent for that month,
subject to adjustment upward or downward to comparable levels for that month.
172. WARTImE PRIcEs & TADE BoARD, Order No. 294, §§4(2) (d), 10(2) (e);
Order No. 315, §§4(2) (d), 10(2) (c). See also France, Law of July 22, 1943, Art. 1,
par. 3 (rent fixed on annual basis in bathing, climatic or thermal resorts); Indo-
China, Decree No. 1406, Art. 2 (1942) (rents in seacoast or mountain resorts fixed
on seasonal basis).
. 173. The provisions as to seasonal variations were added by Supplementary
Amendment No. 16, 8 FED. REG. 2780 (1943) ; see OPA FiFrH Q. REP. 45 (1943).
174. WARTImE PRICES & TRADE BoARD, Order No. 294, § 4(2) (a); Order No.
315, §4(2) (e).
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion does not purport to be a complete treat-
ment of the maximum rent date system of rent control. Nothing is
said as to the validity of the system. 1' Nor has there been any dis-
cussion of the matter of adjustments of maximum rents, whether
over-all, by area, by classes of accommodations or tenants, or in indi-
vidual cases. A thorough analysis of these problems would more than
double the length of the present article. All that can be done here is
to point out that in many-perhaps the majority of cases, the frozen
rent is only a starting point from which to calculate adjustments.
General adjustments may be ordered to bring rents more in line with
other prices or to make up for increases in maintenance costs; indi-
vidual adjustments may be authorized to correct some inequity in the
original frozen rent or to take account of supervening changes in cir-
cumstances.
No definitive comparison of the maximum rent date system with
other systems 176 can be made on the basis of the present analysis. One
conclusion which can probably be drawn, however, is that the vaunted
simplicity of the freeze system is in many situations a myth. The idea
of congealing the rent level as of a given day has a superficial attrac-
tiveness," 7' but the practical application of the freeze, as has been seen,
raises many knotty problems, and these only increase as time goes
on and other elements of the economic picture change. History shows
that attempts to maintain a rent freeze over a protracted period of
time are liable to involve governments and legislatures in almost in-
soluble difficulties. But that, too, is another story.178
175. It may be noted in passing that its use in the United States has been held
constitutional. Taylor v. Brown, 137 F.2d 654 (E.C.A. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
787 (1943); Wilson v. Brown, 137 F.2d 348 (E.C.A. 1943); Spaeth v. Brown,
137 F.2d 669 (E.C.A. 1943); Madison Park Corp. v. Bowles, 140 F.2d 316 (E.C.A.
1943); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
176. See Willis, "Fair Reid" Systems, 16 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 104 (1947);
Maximum Rents: The "Percentage" Method, 23 TEmp. L.Q. 122 (1949).
177. Some legislators or rulers in their naivet6 have thought it sufficient simply
to provide that no rents should be increased. See, e.g., Guatemala President Ubico's
decree No. 2749 of May 5, 1942, the only material part of which provides that "For
the duration of the war in which the Republic is involved, the owners of buildings
may not receive for their rental rents higher than those which their tenants are actually
paying, nor increase, under any pretext, those which have been agreed upon."
178. The writer hopes to treat these matters in a projected article on the history
of rent control.
